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A version of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Eco-
nomics that applies to a money-free environment, in which a set of
indivisible goods needs to be matched to some set of agents, is estab-
lished. In such environments, \trade" can be identied with the set
of hierarchical exchange mechanisms dened by Papai (2000). Papai
(2000)'s result - that any such mechanism yields Pareto-optimal al-
locations - can be interpreted as a version of the First Fundamental
Theorem of Welfare Economics for the given environment. In this
note, I show that for any Pareto-optimal allocation and any hierarchi-
cal exchange mechanism one can nd an initial allocation of ownership
rights, such that the given Pareto-optimal allocation arises as a result
of trade.
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1The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics provides con-
ditions under which every equilibrium of competitive markets is Pareto-
optimal. The Second Fundamental Theorem gives some conditions under
which every Pareto-optimal allocation can be sustained as a competitive equi-
librium. Both theorems apply to markets with divisible goods and money.
The present note is concerned with an analogue of the Second Fundamental
Theorem of Welfare Economics for a money-free environment in which some
indivisible goods need to be matched to agents.
The problems considered here are known as \housing problems". A hous-
ing problem (N;K;R) consists in two nite sets of objects, henceforth called
houses, and of agents, K and N, respectively, and R: = (R1; ;Rn) a pro-
le of (strict) preferences of all agents over the houses. The partial proles
of the preferences of the agents in M  N and the remainder are denoted by
RM;R M, respectively. Agent i's most preferred element in K according to
Ri is denoted by top(Ri). Finally, as usual Pi denotes the strict part of Ri.
An allocation dened as any injective function from the smaller set of K
and N to the larger one. In terms of substance, an allocation is such that
no agent obtains more than one house, some agents do not obtain houses
if and only if there are more agents than houses (j N j>j K j), and some
houses remain unmatched if and only if there are more houses than agents
(j K j>j N j). An allocation is denoted as a vector x: = (x1; ;xjNj)
with the understanding that xi denotes the house matched to agent i, where
xi = ; denotes the case in which i does not obtain a house for the given
allocation. Agents are assumed to care only about their own matches and to
prefer any house to no house. As a shorthand, preferences over allocations
are also denoted by Ri with the understanding that xRx0 holds if and only
if xiRix0
i.
Any function from K to N is called an assignment. According to an
assignment, multiple houses might be mapped to the same agent. If j N jj
K j the set of allocations is a subset of the set of assignments. Otherwise
allocations are such that some houses remain unmatched, which is ruled out
for assignments.
Let R be the set of all proles R. A social-choice function f maps any
prole R 2 R to an allocation f(R). The houses that are matched to the
2agents in M under allocation f(R) are denoted by fM(R). A mechanism  
is a direct revelation mechanism if the agents' strategies consist in directly
revelations of rankings over the available houses to the designer. The outcome
of direct revelation mechanism   when agents claim the preference prole R
is denoted as  (R), the social choice rule that maps any prole of preferences
R 2 R to  (R) is denoted by f . If the rule f  satises some property X,
then the mechanism   is said to satisfy this property X.
To develop an analogue of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Wel-
fare Economics, a denition of \trade" that is appropriate for the present
environment is needed. Papai (2000)'s hierarchical exchange mechanisms
provide a natural candidate for this purpose. A hierarchical exchange mech-
anism species a system of ownership rights and determines allocations as
the outcomes of free trade for the given ownership rights. The system of
ownership rights consists in an initial assignment of all houses to the agents
and a set of inheritance rules for the houses. Ownership rights in hierarchical
exchange mechanisms are such that each house is always owned by someone.
The inheritance rule solves the problem of the ownership of multiple houses
before the termination of the mechanism: observe that there is a tension be-
tween the following two requirements. On the one hand, the class of trading
mechanisms should be general and therefore allow for a wide variety of initial
ownership structures, which should in particular comprise the case that some
agent starts out owning multiple houses. On the other hand, the mechanism
needs to result in an allocation, meaning that no agent is allowed to obtain
more than one house. Papai (2000) elegantly solves this problem with the
denition of inheritance rules that prescribe how the houses whose owners
leave the market should be distributed to the remaining agents. In hierar-
chical exchange mechanisms, trade is identied with a sequence of trading
cycles.
Serial dictatorships and Gale's top trading cycles mechanism are special
cases of hierarchical exchange mechanisms (for housing problems with jKj =
jNj). In the case of a serial dictatorship, some agent starts out owning
all houses. His appropriation of one of the houses can be interpreted as
the formation of a trading cycle of length one. The inheritance rule then
prescribes that a next agent inherits the entire remainder of houses. In
3Gale's top trading cycles mechanism, each agent starts out owning exactly
one house. All agents are then asked to point to the owners of their most
preferred house. At least one cycle forms. All agents in this cycle trade
houses. The remaining agents repeat the procedure with the set of remaining
houses. Inheritance rules do not play any role in Gale's top trading cycles
mechanism, as there are no owners of multiple houses.
Formally, Papai (2000) denes hierarchical exchange mechanisms as lists
of inheritance trees   = ( a(V;Q;L;H))a2K. Each inheritance tree  a(V;Q;L;H)1
is a rooted tree where V is the set of vertices, and Q  V  V is the set of
arcs. The function L : V ! N labels each vertex with an individual, the
function H : Q ! K labels each arc with a house. The root of the tree  a is
labeled with the initial owner of a, say this is agent i. The labels on the arcs
following this vertex denote agent i's possible matches. If agent i is matched
to house b, then the label of vertex following on the arc with the label b
determines the next owner of a. Continuing in this way, one can determine
all the potential inheritances by following the appropriate arcs.2
To qualify as inheritance trees, the trees have to satisfy a set of technical
conditions specied by Papai (2000, p. 1409). These conditions ensure, for
example, that no agent appears twice on the same inheritance path. Since
the present note does not make explicit use of these conditions, they are
not stated here. Hierarchical exchange mechanisms are group-strategyproof
in the sense that for all R, there do not exist M  N and e RM such that
f (e RM;R M)RMf (R) and f 
M(e R;R M)M 6= f 
M(R). The fact is established
as part of the main characterization result in Papai (2000, p. 1425). A mech-
1I replace Papai (2000)'s denition of an inheritance tree  a(V;Q) which presumes
the labeling functions L;H by an expression that explicitly lists the labeling functions:
 a(V;Q;L;H). This allows me to dene the concept of permutations of roles for hierar-
chical exchange mechanisms.
2In terms of this formalism, Gale's top trading cycles mechanisms can be dened
through any list of inheritance trees   = ( a(V;Q;L;H))a2K with the feature that no
two roots are labeled with the same agent. This implies that each agent starts out owning
exactly one house. The inheritance rule consequently plays no role, which in turn implies
that any list of inheritance trees with the named feature denes the same to trading cy-
cles mechanisms. Conversely, the root of every tree of a serial dictatorship mechanism is
labeled with the same agent. Every vertex ensuing on the initial node is labeled with the
second dictator and so forth.
4anism is considered strategyproof if the condition of group-strategyproofness
holds for all singleton \groups" M. A mechanism is called Pareto-optimal if
any outcome x =  (R) of the mechanism is Pareto-optimal according to the
prole of preferences R. The sets of agents and houses eliminated in the tth
round of the mechanism are denoted by Wt(R) and Ft(R), respectively.
The outcome of a hierarchical exchange mechanism can be calculated
sequentially as follows: rst, eliminate all agents and houses in the rst set
of top trading cycles W1(R) and F1(R); their matches are f 
W1(R)(R). The
allocation for all other agents N n W1(R) can be calculated as the outcome
of a submechanism  0, which is dened through a set of inheritance trees
a2K0 0
a(Q0;V 0;L0;H0) that have been reduced as follows. Let vi be a vertex
such that L(vi) 2 W1(R) and let a be the match of L(vi) under the rst set of
top trading cycles, let H(vi;vj) = a, in words, let (vi;vj) be the arc following
vi that is labeled with L(vi)'s match. Replace vi and the corresponding
subtree by the vj and the following subtree (keeping the labels of the latter
subtree). The rationale behind this step in the construction of the inheritance
trees  0
a(Q0;V 0;L0;H0) is that agents in W1(R) have already been matched to
houses and therefore can no longer inherit any houses. Whenever they would
inherit a house according to some inheritance tree, that is, whenever their
name would appear as the label on some vertex vi in one of the remaining
trees, the house that they would inherit is passed on to the agent that follows
on the arc labeled that agent's match. Once there is no more vertex for an
agent in W1(R) left, go on to eliminate all arcs that are labeled with houses in
F1(R) and their ensuing subtrees. This latter step can be explained through
the observation that the case that some agent not in W1(R) is matched to a
house in F1(R) is irrelevant; these houses have all been already matched in
the rst round. It is a purely technical matter to show that a submechanism
 0 satises the dening properties for hierarchical exchange mechanism given
by Papai (2000, p. 1409).
With this denition of hierarchical exchange mechanisms in hand, one
can now state an analogue for the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics as
Theorem 1 Any hierarchical exchange mechanism   = ( a(V;Q;L;H))a2K
is strategyproof and Pareto-optimal.
5Proof Theorem 1 is a part of the main result of Papai (2000, p. 1425) and
proven by her. 
The main result of the present note is, in a sense, the converse of Theorem
1. In tune with the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, I
claim that for any Pareto-optimal allocation x in a housing problem (N;K;R)
and any structure of ownership given by some hierarchical exchange mecha-
nisms one can nd a way to assign the given ownership rights to the agents
such that x is the outcome of the mechanism. To formalize this idea, we
need to distinguish between the ownership structure dened through a mech-
anism and the initial assignment of ownership rights for a given hierarchical
exchange mechanism   = ( a(V;Q;L;H))a2K. I view the trees together with
the labels denoting houses (  = ( a(V;Q;;H))a2K) as the given structure
of ownership. The labeling function L represents a particular assignment
dened by the mechanism. Any allocation of initial ownership in a hierarchi-
cal exchange mechanism can be achieved through a permutation of the roles
played by the agents.
Denition 1 A permutation of roles p consists of a bijection p : N !
N. A permutation of roles p induces a permuted hierarchical exchange
mechanism p( ) which is dened through p( ) = a2K a(V;Q;p  L;H).
A mechanism and its permutation foresee the same types of ownership
rights over houses. The only dierences between a hierarchical exchange
mechanism   and a permutation of the mechanism p( ) lies in the permuta-
tion of the roles played by the agents. The main result of the note can now
be stated as:
Theorem 2 Let x be a Pareto-optimal allocation in a housing problem (N;K;R).
Fix a hierarchical exchange mechanism  . Then there exists a permutation
of roles p such that x is the outcome of p( ).
The proof of this result is based on the idea that in each Pareto optimum
there is some agent i who obtains his most preferred house out of the grand
set top(Ri). If the initial assignment is such that this agent starts out owning
this house, he will form a trading cycle of length one by pointing to himself,
6leaving the mechanism. Since x is Pareto-optimal, there exists an agent j
who is matched to his most preferred house xj out of the remaining houses.
Ownership rights on the remainder of houses are arranged such that, after the
elimination of the rst agent, this agent j becomes the owner of xj. The proof
proceeds inductively until all ownership rights have been determined. To
make this proof work, I rst need to show that the outcome of a hierarchical
exchange mechanism does not depend on the order in which top trading
cycles are eliminated. (According to Papai (2000)'s denition all cycles that
form in some stage t eliminated simultaneously.) I do so in the next two
lemmata.
Denition 2 An assignment rule f is group-nonbossy if for all R  R,
M  N, and e RM, fM(R) = fM(e RM;R M) implies f(R) = f(e RM;R M).
Group-nonbossiness ensures that groups cannot change the assignment
for agents that do not belong to the group, by reporting dierent preferences
without changing their own. If one restricts the groups M in the denition
to singletons, one obtains the standard denition of nonbossiness (as dened,
for example, by Papai (2000, p. 1422)).
Lemma 1 Any hierarchical exchange mechanism is group-nonbossy.
Proof Suppose there existed a prole of preferences R, a hierarchical ex-
change mechanism  , a subset M  N, and e RM such that f 
M(R) = f 
M(e RM;R M)
holds, but f (R) 6= f (e RM;R M). The latter implies that there is some j = 2
M such that f 
j (R) 6= f 
j (e RM;R M). Now consider the group M0 = M[fjg.
First, consider the case in which f 
j (e RM;R M)Pjf 
j (R). Then the hierarchi-
cal exchange mechanism is not group-strategyproof, as the agents in M0 can
improve the utility of one of its members (namely j), while keeping the util-
ity of all other members constant through misrepresenting their preferences
(e RM for the members of M and the truthful Rj for agent j). If, on the other
hand, f 
j (R)Pif 
j (e RM0;R M0), the same argument holds true for the same
group if the true preferences of agents are (e RM;R M) and the agents in M
misrepresent them to be RM. This yields a contradiction with the character-
ization result proved by Papai (2000, p. 1425), which states that hierarchical
exchange rules are group-strategyproof. 
7Lemma 2 The order of elimination of top trading cycles does not matter.
Proof Suppose there exists a mechanism   and some preference prole R,
such that  (R) eliminates several cycles at some stage, say t. Suppose in that
stage there are two groups of cycles involving the agents in N1 and N2 so
N1 [N2 = Wt(R), and suppose that the allocation following the hierarchical
exchange rule, as dened by Papai (2000) f (R), diers from the allocation
when the cycle(s) involving the agents in N1 are eliminated before the cycle(s)
involving the agents in N2. Now x a house a 2 Ft(R) that is being matched
to an agent in N1 according to f (R) and construct a preference prole e R such
that e Ri = Ri for i = 2 N2 and a e Ria for all i 2 N2 and all houses a 6= a and
ae Rib , aRib for all houses a;b 6= a (meaning the only dierence between R
and e R is that the agents in N2 rank a at the top under e R). Observe that for
all stages z < t the mechanism   induces the exact same trading cycles under
R and under e R. At stage t only the agents in N1 form top trading cycles:
N1 = Wt(e R) and f 
N1(R) = f 
N1(e R). The agents in N2 form top trading cycles
in the next stage: N2  Wt+1(e R) and f 
N2(R) = f 
N2(e R). However, by the
assumption that the elimination of top trading cycles matters, the matches
to agents that have not yet left the mechanism N = N n(
St
z=1 Wt(R)) must
change, that is, f 
N(R) 6= f 
N(e R). This contradicts Lemma 1, which shows
that hierarchical exchange rules must be group-nonbossy. 
We are no ready to prove Theorem 2:
Proof Start of the Induction:
jNj = 2. Note that we must have x1 = top(R1) or x2 = top(R2) for x to
be Pareto-optimal. Choose p such that an agent i who is matched top(Ri)
according to x is the initial owner of top(Ri). He forms a trading cycle of
length one pointing to top(Ri), the other agent obtains his most preferred
house out of the reminder, so x is the outcome of p( ).
Step of the Induction:
Suppose the claim holds for jNj = m.
Now take a housing problem with jNj = m + 1.
8Fix a Pareto-optimal allocation x. Assume w.l.o.g. that top(R1) = x1 =
a. Let j be the initial owner of a and consider the permutation p with
p(1) = j, p(j) = 1 and p(i) = i for i 6= 1;j. Now observe that - restricted to
K n fag and N n f1g - x0 = (x2; ;xn) is also a Pareto-optimal allocation.
By the hypothesis of the induction we can nd a permutation p0 on the set
of roles N nfjg such that for submechanism  0, that arises when eliminating
agent 1 and house a in rst round from p( ), the outcome of p0 0 is x0 when
presuming that agent j assumed the role of agent 1 before the permutation
p0. Dene a permutation p : N ! N such that p(j) = j and p(i) = p0(i)
otherwise. Now consider the mechanism (p  p)( ). According to (p  p)( ),
agent 1 is the initial owner of house a, since top(R1) = x1 = a agent 1 forms
a top trading cycles by pointing to his own house a. By Lemma 2, this
cycle can be eliminated, before any other possibly existing cycles without
any change of the outcome of the hierarchical exchange rule. Once this cycle
is eliminated we are left with the (sub)mechanism p0 0, which according to its
denition, yields the outcome (x2; ;xn) for the remainder of the agents.

The theorem is an extension of the Second Welfare Theorem to an envi-
ronment with indivisible goods such that each agent should be matched to
at most one object. It says that, for any system of property rights and any
Pareto optimum, there exists an allocation of these property rights to agents,
such that the given Pareto optimum is the outcome of free trade among the
agents. The denition of property rights used in this note is very general. It
requires that each house is always owned by someone. It solves the problem
that agents might own multiple houses by the assumption of xed inheritance
processes that prescribe the next owner of a house when the current owner
leaves the market with a house. Papai (2000)'s hierarchical exchange mecha-
nisms arguably describe the most general class of allocation mechanisms for
housing problems that can be considered as derived from the assignment of
property rights together with free trade.
In the literature, large sets of subclasses of hierarchical exchange mecha-
nisms have been characterized by Ma (1994), Svensson (1999), Ergin (2000),
Miyagawa (2002), Ehlers et al. (2002), Ehlers and Klaus (2004), Kesten
(2009), Sonmez and Unver (2006), Ehlers and Klaus (2007), and Velez (2008).
9So the result presented here of course extends to all these. Serial dictator-
ships and the top trading cycles mechanism are also cases of hierarchical
exchange mechanisms. Restricted to these two special cases, the Theorem of
the present note has been shown by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1998).
Pycia and Unver (2009) characterize a superclass of hierarchical exchange
mechanisms. They drop the requirement of reallocation-proofness from Papai
(2000)'s theorem. The class they obtain diers from hierarchical exchange
mechanism in that agents now cannot only be owners of houses, but also
\brokers". These brokers also have control rights over houses; however, these
control rights do not include the right to appropriate a house. Pycia and
Unver (2009) clearly delineate a dierence between ownership and brokerage
of a house; it seems appropriate not to consider this superclass of hierarchical
exchange mechanisms as mechanisms that can be considered to be derive from
solely from the assignment of ownership rights and free trade.
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